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Abstract: The spectacular failure of the 150-year old investment bank Lehman 
Brothers on September 15th, 2008 was a major turning point in the global financial 
crisis that broke out in the summer 2007. Through the use of stock market data and 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads, this paper examines the investors’ reaction to 
Lehman’s collapse in an attempt to identify a contagion effect on the surviving 
financial institutions. The empirical analysis indicates that (i) the collateral 
damages were limited to the largest financial firms; (ii) the most affected 
institutions were the surviving “non-bank” financial services firms (mortgage and 
specialty finance, investment services, and diversified financial services firms); 
(iii) the negative effect was correlated with financial conditions of the surviving 
institutions. We also detect significant abnormal jumps in the CDS spreads after 
Lehman’s failure that we interpret as evidence of sudden upward revisions in the 
market assessment of future default probabilities for the surviving financial firms. 
Keywords: systemic risk; financial crisis; bank failures; contagion; bailout; 
regulation; Credit Default Swap 
JEL Classification Codes: G21; G28 
 
1. Introduction 
The spectacular failure of the 150-year old investment bank Lehman Brothers has been 
perceived by many as a major turning point in the global financial crisis that broke out in the 
Summer 2007. The specter of systemic risk raised widespread fears of a full-scale collapse of 
the US financial sector due to financial contagion and concerns about significant disturbances 
outside the US, in international financial markets. According to the bankruptcy petition #08-
13555, filed on Monday, September 15th, 2008, Lehman’s total assets of $639 billion made it 
the largest failure in US history, about six times larger than the largest previous failure (see 
Table 1). The complexity of the case relies in part on the billions of dollars in claims from 
creditors and counterparties located in various corners of the financial system. According to 
Lehman’s bankruptcy administrator, the mass of creditors filed more than 60,000 claims 
against the failed investment bank before the deadline imposed by the court, September 22nd, 
2009. 
{Table 1} 
Financial media extensively discussed the case during the week that followed the bankruptcy 
announcement date, often using a broad array of metaphors and bombastic terms: “a tsunami 
sweeping the financial industry” and “sending tremors worldwide”; “a financial 
Armageddon” having “a massive effect on hundreds of other businesses, from real estate to 
restaurants”; “a perfect storm” sparking “a chain reaction that sent credit markets into 
disarray”; “the biggest economic firestorm since the Great Depression” that “presented too 
great a threat to the financial system and the economy” and “set off a cascade of events 
around the globe”; “a devastating blow to the global financial world.”1 However, as noted by 
1 The representative sample of terms quoted here was extracted from articles published by leading financial 
newspapers in the US (Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, New York Daily News etc.) or 
Kaufman (2000), it is not uncommon that the adverse implications of large financial firms’ 
failures are exaggerated in the press, the resulting “tales of horror” being often taken as 
“facts.” He attributes this propensity of the financial media to exaggerate to the veil of 
ignorance that deter the general public to understand very well the functioning and complexity 
of the financial system. As a consequence, the financial sector is somewhat steeped in 
mysticism and exposed to fictitious accounts of its operations, particularly the adverse effects 
of large failures, widespread financial problems and generalized breakdowns. 
Among academics and researchers, there was considerable debate about the nature, triggering 
events, and extent of systemic risk during the recent global financial crisis. This debate 
reflects undoubtedly more general difficulties to define properly the concept of systemic risk 
and the absence of a broad consensus in the financial literature. Kaufman (1994, 2000), De 
Bandt and Hartmann (2002), and Kaufman and Scott (2003) propose excellent surveys on 
contagion and systemic risk in banking and financial systems. Taylor (2009a) provides an 
updated and interesting discussion of systemic risk in the context of the current financial crisis 
and highlights the urgent need for an operational definition of the concept. According to 
Kaufman and Scott (2003), systemic risk -- referring to the risk or probability of widespread 
breakdowns in the entire financial system and evidenced by an extreme clustering of failures -
- is one of the most feared events by banking regulators and supervisors. De Bandt and 
Hartmann (2002) make a useful distinction between narrowly- vs. broadly-defined “systemic 
events.” The first notion refers to occurrences where the failure of a financial institution or 
simply the release of adverse information about its conditions propagates through a “domino 
effect” to other financial institutions and markets. The latter definition include both systemic 
events in the narrow sense and simultaneous adverse effects on a large number of financial 
reports issued by world-class publishers of business and financial information like Dow Jones, Reuters, and 
Bloomberg on days following September 15th, 2008. 
institutions caused by a widespread big or systematic (macro)shock. The various definitions 
place at the core of the concept of systemic risk the notion of contagion, which describes the 
propagation mechanisms of the effects of shocks from one or more financial firms to others. 
The phenomenon of contagion is widely perceived as being more dangerous in the financial 
sector than in other industries because (i) it occurs generally faster; (ii) it spreads more 
broadly within the industry; (iii) it results in a greater number of failures and larger losses to 
creditors; (iv) it can affects otherwise solvent financial institutions (see Kaufman, 1994). For 
all these reasons, it is widely considered that systemic risk is the strongest argument justifying 
the intervention of public authorities in the financial sector. 
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in August 2007, many large institutions at 
the core of the financial systems in developed and developing countries have been bailed out 
by the public authorities in the name of contagion and systemic risk. In the US, for instance, 
financial institutions like Bear Sterns, Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, American Insurance Group, 
and Citigroup were all considered systemically important or “too big (or interconnected) to 
fail” (TBTF) and the government decided to protect them from failure by injecting huge 
amounts of taxpayers’ money. However, in the particular case of Lehman, the outcome was 
drastically different: instead of conceiving an emergency rescue plan, the government allowed 
the nation’s fourth-largest investment bank to collapse when no viable private-sector solution 
could be found.2 The government justified its no-bail-out decision on the grounds that, unlike 
in the case of Bear Sterns, market participants have had sufficient time to prepare themselves 
to absorb the collateral damages eventually caused by the imminent collapse of Lehman. 
Moreover, in contrast to Bear Sterns, Lehman had direct access to short-term facilities from 
2 The failure to find a white knight ready to assume Lehman’s liabilities is clearly due to the government 
decision to refuse any financial facilities to potential interested parties, as it has been the case for instance in 
March 2008 when JP Morgan Chase acquired the troubled investment bank Bear Sterns. 
the Federal Reserve.3 Top government officials also pointed out that they viewed Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac as far more systemically important than Lehman because the two mortgage 
giants own or guarantee about half of home loans originated in the US.4  
In contrast to the government officials’ view, for many observers the failure of Lehman was 
an event triggering systemic risk and panic in financial markets. For instance, Acharya, 
Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini (2009) mention the Lehman failure as a clear example of 
systemic risk that materialized during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. They note, 
with the benefits of hindsight, that Lehman contained “considerable systemic risk” and led to 
“the near collapse of the financial system.” Portes (2008) takes a more sanguine view 
suggesting that the government decision not to rescue Lehman was a policy error that 
exacerbated the adverse effects of the financial crisis. The critics generally share the view that 
the systemic crisis that has emerged in the aftermath of Lehman’s failure could have been 
mitigated if the government had intervened. 
Other influential economists embraced the opposite view, arguing that it was not Lehman’s 
failure but the uncertainty surrounding the ill-conceived 2½-page draft of legislation 
regarding the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) released several days afterward that 
effectively trigger the global panic of the fall 2008. Taylor (2009b) and Cochrane and 
3 Immediately after the near-failure of Bear Stern, on March 17th, 2008, the Federal Reserve created an 
exceptional lending facility (the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, PDCF) that enabled investment banks and other 
primary dealers for the first time to access liquidity in the overnight loans market for short-term needs. The 
PDCF was intended to mitigate adverse effects from future failures of investment banks (see Adrian, Burke, and 
McAndrews, 2009, for further details). 
4 In his press conference on Monday, September 15th 2008, the US Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson 
Jr. clearly stated: “The actions with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so extraordinarily important, 
not only to our capital markets, but to making sure we have plenty of finance in housing, because that is going to 
be the key to turning the corner here.” (Dow Jones Newswire, September 15th, 2008)  
Zingales (2009) are representative of this view. They use event studies based on graphical 
analysis to show that basic risk indicators of stress in the financial sector, such as the Libor-
OIS and CDS spreads, reacted apathetically to Lehman’s collapse. By contrast, the same 
stress indicators exhibited very strong and negative responses just after the Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson testified at the Senate 
Banking Committee about the TARP, several days later, on September 23rd and 24th, 2008. In 
the same vein, Rogoff (2008) contends that in the case of Lehman the government applied the 
right medicine at the right moment and approves its decision to deny taxpayers money to 
rescue the troubled investment bank. 
The main objective of the present study is to answer two research questions related to the 
systemic nature of the collapse of Lehman Brothers viewed as a turning point in the current 
financial crisis. First, through the use of stock market and Credit Default Swap (CDS) data, 
we examine the investors’ reaction to Lehman’s failure in an attempt to identify an eventual 
contagion effect on the surviving financial institutions.5 Our second research question is 
whether the contagion effect, if it was statistically significant, affected the other surviving 
financial firms indiscriminately, that is regardless of potential differences in their risk profiles, 
financial conditions or physical exposures to Lehman. The answers to these questions have 
broad policy implications and help shed light on an unsolved debate about the nature of the 
events triggering systemic risk during the recent global financial crisis. 
5 As noted by Zingales (2008), Lehman’s collapse also had a dramatic impact on money market funds industry. 
The Reserve Primary Fund, a large US money market mutual fund, decided on September 16th to freeze 
redemptions because of its large exposure to Lehman debt. As the net asset value of its shares fell below $1, the 
fund “broke the buck” and contributed to the panic of October 2008. The idea to investigate the effects of 
Lehman’s collapse on the mutual funds industry is left for future work. 
Our paper is related to a recent contribution by Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012) 
investigating the impact of the Lehman collapse on the industrial firms that received 
underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market-making services from Lehman. They conduct an 
event study analysis and show that Lehman’s equity underwriting clients experienced an 
abnormal return of around –5%, on average, on several days surrounding the bankruptcy 
announcement. The negative wealth effects were especially severe for companies that had 
stronger security underwriting relationships with Lehman or were smaller, younger, and more 
financially constrained. Fernando et al. (2012) conclude their article by suggesting an 
interesting interpretation of their findings from a TBTF perspective: the negative effects of a 
large (investment) bank failure on its clients – industrial firms may offer an alternative 
rationale for the government intervention besides the classical systemic risk (financial 
contagion) argument. As we focus on the effects of Lehman’s failure on a different set of 
firms (viz. the surviving financial firms), our findings complement the results reported in 
Fernando et al. (2012) and significantly extend the TBTF / systemic risk interpretation of the 
event of interest.6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research methodology and 
Section 3 describes the data sources used in our study, as well as the sampling procedure. The 
main results concerning the market’s reaction to the Lehman’s failure announcement are 
presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses some policy implications. 
 
6 Our paper is also related to the earlier literature investigating the effects of a large financial institution’s failure 
on the performance of the surviving financial firms (see e.g. Wall and Peterson, 1990; Aharony and Swary, 
1996; Peavy and Hempel, 1998) and the pricing of risk in the financial markets after a TBTF episode or a 
systemic event (see e.g. Cornell and Shapiro, 1986; O’Hara and Shaw, 1991; Brewer et al., 2003; Pop and Pop, 
2009). 
2. Methodology 
To determine whether Lehman’s collapse had a significant impact on the performance of the 
surviving financial firms, we begin by investigating the reaction of the stock market to the 
failure event. For that purpose, we use variations of the conventional event study 
methodology. This section briefly describes our choices for estimating abnormal stock returns 
and compares the benefits and drawbacks of each method within the context of Lehman’s 
failure. 
The first modeling choice has been commonly employed in the financial literature to examine 
the reaction of the stock market to a significant event, such as a regulatory change, affecting 
all firms in the same industry (see e.g. Binder, 1985; Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Cornett 
and Tehranian, 1990; Karafiath et al., 1991; Brewer et al., 2003). Since all firms in our sample 
come from the financial services industry and share common event dates, we have to avoid 
the well-known misspecification problems in the conventional event study methodology due 
to extreme clustering. Indeed, failure to take into account the cross-sectional dependence 
might induce a systematic underestimation of the standard deviation of the mean abnormal 
returns, implying that the standardized test statistic is no longer applicable.7 
According to the first method, what we call the “collateral damage” of Lehman’s failure is 
quantified within a multivariate regression framework that takes the following form: 
                  [1] 
where 
7 According to Schwert (1981), the cross-sectional dependence in returns around the underlying event date is 
mainly due to the fact that firms in the same industry tend to react in the same way to the event of interest. 
Traditional event study methodology assumes independent abnormal returns. An alternative solution would have 
been to adopt a portfolio approach as in Wall and Peterson (1990). 
 is the stock return of financial institution  ( ) on day  ( ); 
 is the corresponding broad market index (S&P 500) return for day ; 
 is the intercept coefficient, an event-independent constant term for financial firm ; 
 is the systematic risk coefficient or the sensitivity of the firm ’s rate of return to changes 
in the market’s rate of return; 
 is a binary variable that equals 1 if the event of interest occurred on day  or during the 
window  ( ) and zero otherwise; 
 is the event coefficient or the sensitivity of bank ’s rate of return to the event of interest; 
 is a random error which is assumed to be independent of the market return, serially 
independent and normally distributed. 
The equation from which the various models are developed can equally be written as 
                   [2] 
or more simply  
                    [3] 
The regression model assumes that the coefficient vector  is the same for all panels and 
the matrix of independent variables  is the same for each equation in the system. We 
also assume that the error terms are i.i.d. within each equation (firm), in addition to having 
different scale variance, i.e. we allow the disturbance variance to differ across equations. 
Finally, following the discussion at the beginning of this section, we assume that the 
contemporaneous covariance of the error terms can differ from zero,  if , 
although the noncontemporaneous covariances are all zero,  if . These 
various assumptions imply that the variance matrix of the disturbance terms can be written as 
      [4] 
where  is the covariance matrix of ,  is the identity matrix and  is the 
Kronecker product. 
Equation [3] can be viewed as a linear system of equations in which a separate equation is 
estimated for each financial institution  included in the final sample. The regression 
parameters are estimated based on Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model using the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation method. The values of the 
parameters  in equation [1] capture the individual banks’ estimated “abnormal” returns 
associated with the failure announcement on day  or during the window . They 
are estimated using daily data before and after the event date over an estimation period 
sufficiently long to obtain meaningful statistical inferences. Precisely, we use stock market 
data for 235 days prior to the event date (t = –235 to t = –1) to 18 days after the event date (t = 
+18), i.e. from October 9th, 2007 to October 9th, 2008. 
While the SUR methodology takes into account the cross-sectional dependence in returns and 
results in more efficient estimates than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, it has its own 
drawbacks. Particularly, estimating abnormal returns with SUR requires that the time 
dimension (i.e. the number of days in the estimation period) be larger than the number of 
firms for the large-sample approximations to be reliable. In addition, for computational 
reasons, the number of observations per firm should exceed the total number of firms, to 
render the variance matrix of the disturbance terms, , of full rank and invertible. 
Consequently, when applying SUR the number of firms included in the estimation sample is 
limited to 250; for that reason, when estimating SUR regressions we selected the 250 largest 
US financial institutions among the 382 firms included in our final sample. 
To capture the behavior of the entire universe of financial firms included in our final sample, 
we privilege in this paper the estimation of the abnormal returns for firm security i on event 
day t, , as the difference between actual returns  and the returns predicted by the 
market model, , where  and  is the stock market return (S&P500) 
for day t: 
         [5] 
where . The market model parameters,  and , are estimated by 
regressing the daily (log-differenced) stock return for the relevant financial firm security, , 
upon the corresponding broad market return, , using ordinary least squares. The market 
model is estimated over a 250-day “estimation window” beginning t = –260 through t = –11. 
We define the “event day” as t = 0 and a time frame of 10 days on either side of the 
announcement date as the “event window.” Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on September 15th, 2008, which is defined as the “event day” t = 0. 
To avoid misspecification problems due to extreme clustering, we use the test statistic 
recommended by Brown and Warner (1985) and also used by O’Hara and Shaw (1990), 
which is free of cross-sectional dependence in the security-specific excess returns. For any 
given day t, the test statistic is defined as: 
         [6] 
where  is the average daily abnormal return across sample banks,  
is the number of firms in the sample j,  is an 
estimator of the standard deviation on day t based on the residual returns in the estimation 
period, and . It is worth noting that by using a time-series of 
average abnormal returns, the test statistic as defined supra is free of any potential bias 
induced by the cross-correlation of security returns in the event period. 
Since the market-model parameters were estimated over the estimation period, the abnormal 
returns are in fact prediction errors. Consequently, the standard deviation estimator used in the 
definition of the test statistic is appropriately adjusted in order not to overstate the 
significance levels. The correction factor is defined as follows: 
       [7] 
where  and  are the mean and variance of the market return in the estimation window. 
The standard error of the forecast is simply calculated by multiplying the estimator of the 
standard deviation on day t by the correction factor. 
The test statistic described above can be easily adjusted to investigate the significance of the 
average abnormal returns aggregated over various event windows. For any interval  in 
the  event window, the test statistic is defined as: 
        [8] 
where  is the cumulative average abnormal return. As in the previous 
case, we use the correction factor  to capture the idea that the market-model parameters are 
subject to estimation errors. 
Finally, as a robustness check we also consider an alternative procedure for the estimation of 
excess returns, which is less sensitive to the reliance on past returns. Precisely, for each 
security the expected return is defined to be equal to the return of the market portfolio. Thus, 
abnormal returns  are defined as the difference between the daily returns of security i on 
day t, , and the daily returns of the market portfolio on day t,  (the market portfolio 
returns are proxied as previously by the total returns of the S&P 500 Index): 
         [9] 
Results from simulations with daily data confirm that the market-adjusted returns procedure 
does a reasonably good job in identifying event-related effects and has high power even in 
cases involving event-date clustering (see Brown and Warner, 1985). The significance tests 
are adjusted using standard procedures described in Brown and Warner (1985). 
In what follows, all the results discussed at length in Section 4 are based on the market-model 
abnormal returns. For the sake of comparison, we also mention the estimations obtained using 
the first method, i.e. the SUR framework, particularly when the results obtained by applying 
alternative modeling choices improve the overall interpretation. 
 
3. Data description 
To document empirically the potential contagion effects related to Lehman’s failure on the 
other financial firms, we collect detailed pricing-relevant information from the US stock 
market. This section briefly describes the sampling procedures and data sources used in our 
empirical analysis. 
Our dataset is built using financial information reported in Bloomberg database. We collect 
daily stock price data from January 1st, 2008, to December 31st, 2008, for all large publicly 
traded financial firms. By “large” we mean every institution that reported total assets higher 
than US$ 1 billion in the last audited financial report before the event date. By “financial” we 
mean every institution operating in the same industry as Lehman’s (Finance-Investment, SIC 
code 6211) or primarily in other fields of finance (banking; equity investment instruments; 
asset management; consumer finance; investment services, mortgage finance, specialty 
finance…). For stocks that were simultaneously listed on more than one exchange, pricing 
information is collected from the most actively traded exchange or the primary exchange for 
the stock. Bloomberg reports daily opening, closing, high/low, bid/ask prices, as well as 
historical series of trading volumes. The price data are adjusted to reflect major capital events 
that include scrip issues/rights offerings, open offers, stock splits and consolidations, 
reductions of capital, scrip (stock) dividends etc.8 Our initial sample includes 413 financial 
institutions. However, our final sample satisfies the following additional selection criteria: 
 using Dow Jones Factiva database, we imposed that major capital events such as stock 
splits, stock dividends, and other significant news did not occur on the event day; 
 we dropped all banks that had “thinly” traded stocks during the sample period, defined 
as those for which daily stock price data were missing for more than six consecutive 
trading days; 
 finally, for a financial firm to be included in our sample, it must have no missing stock 
return data on the event day. 
These selection criteria reduced our final sample to 382 financial institutions: 305 “banks” (of 
which 60 S&Ls) and 77 “non-bank” financial services firms (including Lehman). To explain 
better the stock market reaction to the failure event, we also collected financial information 
from Bloomberg for each firm included in our final sample. Credit rating information for a 
sub-sample of rated financial institutions was collected from Reuters and Bloomberg, while 
8 The general principle upon which Bloomberg makes all adjustments is to render past data fully comparable 
with current data. 
the list of the largest physical exposures to Lehman and its subsidiaries are obtained from 
Epiq Systems, the corporate restructuring company that administrate Lehman’s bankruptcy.9 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Evidence of contagion effects in stock market prices 
Did the failure announcement have a significant impact on the surviving financial firm stock 
returns? Did the shareholder reactions to Lehman’s collapse vary across individual financial 
firms? To answer these questions, Table 2 reports the F-statistic for the following two 
hypotheses:  
 H0
1: 1=…= N=0, i.e. the individual abnormal returns are jointly equal to zero for each 
day in the event window [-2; +2] and each sub-sample of financial firms; 
 H0
2: 1=…= N, i.e. the individual abnormal returns are jointly equal to each other. 
The abnormal returns for a five-day period surrounding the failure announcement date (day 0 
or September 15th, 2008) are derived from the SUR framework described in the methodology 
section. The full sample of US financial firms was partitioned into various sub-samples with 
respect to size (Panel A) and type of activity (Panel B). Inspecting Table 2, in the vast 
majority of cases, both hypotheses are soundly rejected: the failure announcement triggered a 
significant reaction in the stock market and shareholder responses varied substantially across 
individual financial firms. 
{Table 2} 
9 We are grateful to Tina Wheelon (Epiq System) for help with data. 
The refine this preliminary finding, we also report in Tables 3 and 4 the results of the event 
study analysis described in Section 2, separately for the global sample (N = 382), as well as 
for various subsamples defined with respect to size (small, medium, and large) or type of 
activity (banking firms; non-bank FIs; commercial banks; S&Ls; diversified financial services 
firms; investment services firms; mortgage and specialty finance firms; and consumer finance 
firms). On average, the abnormal returns calculated over the event window [–2 ; +2] are not 
statistically significant for the entire sample of FIs. The negative average abnormal return of –
0.50% reported on day t = 0 (September 15th, 2008) is due to the inclusion of Lehman in the 
global sample. When we exclude the failed investment bank from the sample, the average 
abnormal return of the surviving FIs on day t = 0 is positive (+0.24%), albeit not statistically 
distinguishable from zero.10 
{Table 3} 
One may be tempted to infer that the bankruptcy filing by Lehman on Monday, September 
15th, did not trigger any significant reaction in the stock market. However, aggregating all 
data into a single global sample could mask significant heterogeneity among listed FIs. 
Scrutinizing Table 3, we can observe that the smallest FIs experience a significantly positive 
abnormal return of +3.03% according to the parametric t-test (p-value < 0.05) on the event 
day.11 This result suggests that at least for the smallest FIs, the stock market reaction was 
driven by factors other than “contagion.” To strengthen our argument, it is worth noting that 
the vast majority (almost 90%) of FIs included in the “small-size” subsample are small 
10 This result is confirmed when we employ alternative modeling choices for estimating abnormal returns, based 
on the SUR methodology or the market-adjusted procedure (omitted output). 
When the “small size” sample is defined with respect to the 1st quartile of the total assets (TA) variable, we 
find that the smallest FIs ($1,000 mil. < TA < $1,600 mil.) experience a significantly positive abnormal return of 
+3.65% (p-value < 0.01) on the event day.
commercial banks and S&Ls, without any significant exposure to Lehman. The “medium-
size” FIs are not affected on average by the event, while the Top 20 “surviving” FIs show a 
negative abnormal return of –8.57%, significant at the 1% level and robust to the exclusion of 
Lehman from the “big-size” subsample (see Table 3). 
To refine the interpretation of the results obtained for the largest FIs and reduce the 
arbitrariness behind the definition of the “big size” sample, we implement the following 
iterative procedure. First, we classify the entire population of financial firms according to the 
size of their balance-sheets as reported in the interim financial statements released at the end 
of June 2008. Second, we conduct iteratively the significance tests described in Section 2 for 
various portfolios including the k largest FIs, where k goes successively from 20 to 382 firms. 
The iterative procedure stops when the test indicates for the first time a switch from 
significant to non-significant abnormal returns on the event day 0 at the conventional 
statistical levels (1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively). Finally, we retain the cut-off value of k*, as 
well as the corresponding test statistics and associated p-values. 
The iterative procedure described above helps shed light on a highly relevant public policy 
issue: how many of the largest US financial firms, taken together as a portfolio, show a 
significant negative abnormal return in the aftermath of Lehman’s collapse? We find that the 
Top 35 / 49 / 69 largest FIs exhibit, on average, a significant abnormal return of –6.32% (p-
value < 0.01) / –4.28% (p-value < 0.05) / –3.50% (p-value < 0.10) on day 0.12 These findings 
imply that the collateral damages associated with Lehman’s failure were indeed limited to the 
largest financial firms. The result is reinforced by the analysis of the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR). The CARs computed over whatever window are not significantly different 
12 Notice that, in contrast to the “small-size” sample, among the largest FIs composing the various “big-size” 
samples (Top 35 / 49 / 69 biggest FIs) there are many “non-bank” diversified financial services firms. 
from zero neither for the full sample nor for the “medium-size” sample. Yet, the largest FIs 
show a significant negative CAR over various short windows surrounding the event date (see 
Table 3).13  
After providing evidence that at least the largest US financial firms were hit by the Lehman 
failure, we turn now to the question whether the contagion effect was firm- or industry-
specific. We have already mentioned in the introduction the distinction between the two types 
of failure contagion and noticed its relevance from a regulatory perspective. To test the 
hypothesis that the most affected financial firms are those having common characteristics 
with Lehman (i.e. operating in the same market or product area), we partitioned the full 
sample into eight subsamples according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and 
Bloomberg Industry Group classifications: (i) banks and savings and loans (N = 305); (ii) 
commercial banks (N = 249); (iii) savings and loans (N = 60); (iv) mortgage and specialty 
finance (N = 18); (v) “non-bank” financial institutions (N = 77); (vi) diversified financial 
services firms (N = 54); (vii) investment services firms (N = 18); and (viii) consumer finance 
(N = 14). It is worth noting that according to these classifications, Lehman belongs to three 
13 We selected relatively short windows surrounding the event date because outside these short windows there 
were many significant events that may have affected the perception of Lehman’s failure in the stock market. 
Particularly, on Tuesday, September 16th (day +1), the US Federal Reserve agrees to lend the American 
International Group (AIG) $85 billion in return for a 79.9% equity stake. Consequently, the CAR over the 
window [0; +1] should be interpreted as the net effect of two opposite regulatory policies: a laissez-faire 
approach (Lehman) and a bailout decision (AIG). On Wednesday, September 17th (day +2), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission restricted short selling in an attempt to decelerate the rapid fall of the largest firms’ share 
value; an emergency ban on shorting FIs’ stocks was pronounced one day later, on September 18th (day +3). On 
September 19th (day +4), the US Treasury announced its decision to guarantee money market mutual funds up to 
an amount of $50 billion to ensure their viability. The proposed $700 billion bailout package to rescue the US 
financial system was debated by the Congress on September 23–24 (days +6 to +7). 
subsamples, namely “non-bank FIs” (v), “diversified financial services” (vi), and “investment 
services” (vii). The results reported in Table 4 lend support to the thesis that the collateral 
damage was firm-specific rather than industry-wide-specific. The highest and most significant 
negative abnormal returns are observed for the “surviving” financial firms providing 
mortgages, mortgage insurance, and other related services (–7.41%, significant at the 5% 
level) or operating in the same subsectors as Lehman: diversified financial services (–4.58%, 
p-value < 0.01); non-bank financial activities (–4.06%, p-value < 0.05); and investment 
services (–3.94%, p-value < 0.05). Among the firms operating in the banking sector 
(commercial banks and S&Ls), only the largest ones show significant negative abnormal 
returns (–5.14, significant at the 5% level). 
{Table 4} 
Overall, the preliminary findings discussed in this section indicates that the collateral damages 
associated to Lehman’s collapse were limited to (i) the largest financial institutions 
(presumably the most exposed to the failure of the investment bank); (ii) the financial services 
firms operating in the same product area as the failed investment bank (non-bank activities, 
diversified financial services, and investment services); and (iii) firms providing mortgages, 
mortgage insurance, and other related services (i.e. operating in perhaps the most shaky sector 
after the summer 2007 and at the core of the current financial crisis). In the next section, we 
attempt to refine these findings by investigating more deeply the link between individual 
abnormal returns and various proxies for the FIs’ risk profile. 
 
4.2. Firm-specific vs. industry-wide collateral damages 
To gain further insights into the results reported in the previous section, we examine in this 
section the economic determinants of the stock market reaction to the Lehman failure 
announcement. In this respect, we focus our analysis on a broad set of financial variables 
capturing three main dimensions of financial firms’ performance, namely, risk profile, 
leverage, and profitability. All balance-sheet variables are measured by using accounting data 
reported in the interim financial statements disclosed by each firm in our sample at the end of 
June 2008. 
The risk profile is proxied by the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans, the loan loss 
provisions divided by the total loans, and the ratio of non-performing assets as a fraction of 
total assets. Higher values of these ratios indicate a deteriorated credit risk profile. 
Alternatively, as a broad market measure of the risk profile and financial conditions, we also 
use the credit ratings assigned by the two main rating agencies (Moody’s and S&P) during the 
week preceding the Lehman failure announcement. These ratings represent an appreciation of 
the capacity of a FI to honor its senior unsecured long term financial commitments, 
denominated in local/foreign currency. The two agencies use similar scales and criteria, and 
assign comparable ratings. The credit ratings are converted to cardinal value according to the 
following scale: AAA/Aaa = 1, AA+/Aa1 = 2, AA/Aa2=3 etc., and then averaged across the 
two rating agencies. Hence, a lower cardinal value corresponds to a higher credit quality. 
Finally, an interesting risk proxy to be considered in our analysis is based on the physical 
exposure to Lehman.14 The “largest exposure” dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm is on 
the Epiq System list of the largest reported claims and 0 otherwise. We conjecture that 
creditors having a significant physical exposure to Lehman should experience more adverse 
14 We considered the total amount of exposure, including different kinds of claims: loans, letters of credit, 
derivative and swap contracts, commercial papers obligations, bonds etc. The mass of Lehman’s creditors filed 
more than 60,000 claims against the failed investment bank before the deadline imposed by the bankruptcy 
court, September 22nd, 2009. Note however that some of the claims are duplicates, i.e. claims filed for the same 
amount against several different Lehman units. According to Lehman claim administrator Epiq Systems, the 
duplicate or erroneous claims have been corrected. 
valuation effects. It is worth noting that the physical exposures to Lehman were disclosed 
progressively, in most cases after the end of our short event window. Consequently, we 
suppose implicitly that information on exposures is already distilled in stock market prices 
during the several days surrounding the bankruptcy announcement date. Finally, an alternative 
risk proxy we use is the market measure of the probability of failure, computed as the ratio of 
the variance of equity returns over the 250-day estimation window divided by one plus the 
average equity return over the same window, squared (see Blair and Heggestad, 1978; Koehn 
and Santomero, 1980; and Appendix 1, for additional insights). 
The degree of operating leverage is measured by the total debt / total assets ratio, the common 
equity / total asset ratio, and a bank-specific measure of the capital adequacy, the risk-based 
capital ratio. To distinguish between the impact of potential solvency problems and liquidity 
shortages, we also considered two additional gearing ratios that take into account the debt 
maturity structure: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets and short-term borrowings 
divided by the total liabilities and equity. We expect that FIs whose financing model is similar 
to Lehman, i.e. relying on rolling-over substantial amounts of short-term debt on a long-term 
basis, would be more affected by the failure. 
Finally, the profitability dimension is proxied by conventional ratios: the return on equity 
(ROE), return on assets (ROA), and the net income to total assets ratio. We also considered an 
efficiency ratio computed as the cost to income ratio, expressed in percentages. Our 
conjecture is that FIs in better shape than their peers may have an improved shock-absorbing 
capacity and would be less affected by the Lehman failure. 
Besides the size and industry classification, we ask the question whether there is any other 
significant difference between the four sub-samples of financial firms (small- vs. big-size; 
banks vs. non-banks FIs) that could explain the reaction of the stock market to the failure 
announcement. To answer this question, Table 5 summarizes the results of bivariate 
comparisons of the above mentioned risk, leverage, and profitability variables. Specifically, 
we compare the distribution of each performance variable in the four sub-samples of FIs by 
performing standard mean tests and two non-parametric tests: a chi-square two-sample test on 
the equality of medians and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the hypothesis that two 
independent samples are from populations with the same distribution. 
{Table 5} 
As far as the risk profile is concerned, it is apparent that the credit quality is significantly 
more deteriorated in the big-size (TA > Q3) and non-banks sub-samples. Note however, that 
the number of “non-bank” financial services firms reporting bank-specific variables, such as 
loan loss reserves and provisions, is quite low, rendering the cross-sector comparisons of 
these bank-specific variables less informative. As revealed by the data, the largest FIs and the 
non-bank financial firms are also more leveraged on average than their smaller peers and 
competitors operating in the banking sector. As before, the number of “non-bank” financial 
services firms reporting bank-specific capital adequacy measures like the risk-based capital 
ratio is quite low (12 against 288 banks), yielding to little informative comparisons in this 
particular case. Finally, the bivariate analysis of the various profitability measures does not 
allow us to infer clear conclusions, except that the larger FIs are somewhat more efficient than 
their smallest competitors. 
We also report in Table 5 descriptive statistics for other control variables: firm size (total 
assets and total market value, expressed in million US dollars), price-to-book ratio, the 
fraction of the core banking activities (net loans to total assets ratio), and the extent to which 
the asset portfolio contains large amounts of market securities (the ratio of market securities 
to total assets). By design, the total assets and market values are significantly higher in the 
big-size sample ($170-180 billion against $45-46 billion). Moreover, the “non-bank” FIs are 
significantly larger than their “bank” peers ($92-93 billion against $33-34 billion). Not 
surprisingly, the fraction of net loans is higher for small FIs, given the composition of the two 
subsamples defined with respect to size,15 and for firms operating in the banking sector. At the 
other extreme, the largest FIs and “non-bank” financial firms invest a higher fraction of their 
asset portfolios in marketable securities. 
To determine whether the observed contagious effects were discriminating rather than 
undifferentiated, we report in Table 6 the pairwise correlation coefficients between 
standardized abnormal returns on day t = 0 (SAR0) and standardized cumulative abnormal 
returns over the window [0; +1] (SCAR[0; +1]), on the one side, and a group of factors that 
could explain the market’s reaction to the Lehman failure. The correlation coefficients are 
computed for the global sample, as well as for the two sub-samples defined with respect to the 
industry classification: banks vs. non-banks. Both measures of abnormal returns are negatively 
correlated with all the risk measures and positively correlated with the profitability variables, 
especially for the FIs included in the “banks” sub-sample. That is, the more deteriorated the 
banking performance, the more negative and stronger the reaction of stock market prices to 
the bankruptcy announcement. We also find strong correlations between the degree of 
operating leverage and abnormal returns: the higher the leverage, the more negative the 
reaction of the stock market, irrespective of the (sub)sample used in the analysis. 
{Table 6} 
As previously anticipated, the two proxies for firm size and the “non-banks” dummy are 
strongly and negatively correlated with both measures of abnormal returns. This result is fully 
15 Indeed, the small-size sub-sample contains mostly commercial banks and S&Ls, while the big-size sub-sample 
includes a high number of investment services firms. 
consistent with the preliminary findings discussed in the preceding section. Interestingly, the 
fraction of total assets invested in marketable securities is positively correlated with abnormal 
returns in the “banks” sample and negatively correlated in the “non-bank” sample. This means 
that for banks the portfolio of marketable securities is viewed as a liquidity cushion, while in 
the case of non-bank FIs, the marketable securities are perceived as a significant source of 
concern and uncertainty. 
Overall, the results presented in this section lend empirical support to the thesis that the 
observed contagious effects in the aftermath of Lehman’s collapse were consistent with a 
discriminating pricing and the information-based contagion effect hypothesis. Put differently, 
the contagion was firm-specific and discriminating rather than industry-wide or 
undifferentiated: the most affected financial firms were those having common characteristics 
with Lehman, i.e. operating in the same market, subsector or product area. Even more 
importantly, the individual abnormal stock returns are found to be strongly correlated with 
financial firms’ fundamentals (risk profile, leverage, and profitability). 
 
4.3. Abnormal jumps in CDS prices 
To detect significant abnormal jumps in the pricing of risk in the credit derivatives market, we 
employ two straightforward statistical procedures: (i) a classical mean test and (ii) a constant 
mean model. In the first case, our conjecture is that the mean of changes in CDS spreads 
should be positive in the aftermath of Lehman’s collapse, indicating a sudden upward revision 
in the market assessment of future default probabilities for the surviving financial firms. In the 
second case, the test consists of comparing the spread levels before and after the event date in 
order to detect a material break (or “jump”) in CDS pricing. 
For our mean test (i), we calculate the average spread changes for each day of the combined 
period (estimation and event windows) and then we sum over several days in the event 
window to obtain a measure of the cumulative average CDS spread change. The statistical 
significance of these measures can be judged by estimating the standard deviation of CDS 
spread changes over the estimation period. 
Following the previous literature (see e.g. Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 2004), we 
control for market-wide systematic factors by computing CDS spread changes that are 
adjusted by changes of a CDS index:16 
     [10] 
where  is the CDS spread level, expressed in basis points, for the financial obligor i on 
a given day t and  is the CDS index level on day t. 
The constant mean model (ii) is similar to the constant mean return model used in stock 
market event studies. The CDS spread is modeled in this case as 
       [11] 
16 The CDS index’s source data as well as all the CDS composite spreads used in our analysis comes from 
Thomson Reuters. Based on the most liquid (i.e. 5-year) CDS contracts, the CDS index is equally weighted and 
reflect an average mid-spread calculation of the index’s constituents. Thomson Reuters proprietary indices are 
rebalanced every six months to better reflect liquidity in the CDS market. Note that as broad indices for the CDS 
market (e.g. TracX, CDX, iTraxx, S&P/ISDA CDS Indices) have only recently been launched, Hull et al. (2004) 
and Norden and Weber (2004) among others, compute “rating-adjusted CDS spreads” by subtracting an index of 
spreads for a given rating from each CDS spread with the same rating. Specifically, daily CDS spread index 
level is computed by those authors as the equally-weighted cross-sectional mean of all CDS spreads for a certain 
broad rating class (AAA and AA, A, and BBB) in their samples. In this paper, we don’t use rating-adjusted 
spreads because our CDS dataset contains a relatively small number of reference entities (18 banks and 67 non-
bank FIs) and broad market CDS indices exist and are actively traded in 2008. 
where  is the mean of the CDS spread and  the time period t disturbance term for 
financial obligor i with an expectation  and variance . For each day 
of the event window, the abnormal CDS spread is estimated as 
       [12] 
where  designates the sample mean of the CDS spread over the estimation period. The 
cumulative abnormal CDS spread for event windows composed of days  through  is 
naturally defined as 
       [13] 
The test statistics used to investigate whether the event of interest has a significant impact on 
CDS pricing are constructed in a similar way as those commonly used in stock market event 
studies. 
Figure 1a illustrates, in some basic way, Taylor’s (2009b) and Cochrane and Zingales’s 
(2009) idea that risk indicators of stress in the financial sector, such as the Libor-OIS spread 
and 1-year CDS spreads for Citigroup Inc., reacted much more strongly after the TARP 
testimony on September 23–24, 2008 than in the aftermath of Lehman’s collapse.17 However, 
if we focus on 5-year Citi-CDS quotes (Figure 1b), as this is the benchmark maturity in the 
CDS market, or longer maturity contracts (e.g. 10-year CDS as in Figure 1c), the reaction to 
17 In their WSJ article, published on September 15th, 2009, Cochrane and Zingales (2009) don’t mention the 
tenor of the CDS contract for Citigroup used to draw their chart suggestively titled “When concern turned to 
panic.” By comparing Citi-CDS spreads of different maturities reported by various data providers (MarkIT, 
Credit Market Analysis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters), we infer that the CDS depicted in Cochrane and 
Zingales’s (2009) chart is the 1-year contract. 
Lehman’s failure appears of the same order of magnitude, if not larger, than the perceived 
impact of the TARP testimony. 
{Figure 1ab&c} 
To further investigate the effects of Lehman’s collapse in the credit derivatives market, we 
collect Thomson Reuters CDS data over the period from January 1st, 2008, through December 
31st, 2008, for all US reference entities belonging to the financial sector. We remove from our 
initial sample Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in order not to overstate the results, as well as 
those reference entities for which no CDS prices were available on the event date or CDS 
spread changes were zero over the 5-day event window [–2; +2]. Our final CDS sample 
includes 85 obligors (18 banks and 67 non-bank FIs). 
{Table 7} 
We present in Table 7 the average changes in the adjusted CDS spreads (expressed in basis 
points) on various periods surrounding the event date, separately for the 1-year CDS contracts 
(Panel A) and 5-year CDS contracts (Panel B).18 For the sake of comparison, we also report in 
the same table the results obtained when the statistical tests are conducted on days 
surrounding Ben Bernanke’s and Henry Paulson’s TARP speeches before the Senate Banking 
Committee on September 23rd and 24th, 2008 (“TARP testimony”, day 0 and +1 respectively). 
On average, the adjusted CDS change is significant and positive on September 15th for the 
reference entities included in the whole sample: +60.50 bps (p < 0.01) and +87.58 bps (p < 
0.01), depending on the maturity (one and five years, respectively). If we follow previous 
empirical studies on CDS pricing and focus our analysis on the 5-year CDSs (Panel B), which 
18 To save space, we do not report the average changes in the adjusted CDS spreads for the 10-year contracts as 
they are similar with those reported in Table 7 (Panel B). 
are the most popular contracts among market participants and, hence, the most liquid ones, we 
observe a stronger reaction for non-bank FIs (+91.64 bps) compared with banks (+72.24 bps). 
Moreover, the cumulative change over the various windows surrounding the failure 
announcement is also significant, even if no significant change is detected before the event 
day.19 
The results reported in Table 7 also indicate an abnormal upward revision of default 
probabilities for the surviving financial firms after the TARP testimony (+43.55 bps, p < 
0.05), consistent with the intuition put forward by Taylor (2009b) and Cochrane and Zingales 
(2009). However, compared to Lehman’s collapse, the reaction of the CDS market to the 
TARP speeches is somewhat weaker, not stronger, both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
After the spectacular failure of the 150-year old investment bank Lehman Brothers on 
September 15th 2008, a broad debate about the nature, triggering events, and extent of 
systemic risk during the recent global financial crisis has sharply divided economists and 
underlined the urgent need for an operational framework to analyze and assess systemic 
events. For many observers, the failure of Lehman was a clear example of systemic risk that 
materialized during the current global financial crisis. The critics generally share the view that 
19 We confirm these findings using the alternative statistical test based on the constant mean model described in 
this section (unreported result). We also repeat all the statistical tests without adjusting CDS spreads for general 
market conditions and find that the results, including the levels of significance, are quite similar: +98.14 bps (p < 
0.01) for the global sample; +79.52 bps (p < 0.01) for the “bank” sample; +103.34 bps (p < 0.01) for the “non-
bank” sample on day 0 and using 5-year CDS contracts. 
the government decision not to rescue the troubled investment bank was a big mistake that 
exacerbated the adverse effects of the financial crisis. Other influential economists embraced 
the opposite view, arguing that it was not Lehman’s failure but the uncertainty surrounding 
the first draft of legislation regarding the TARP released several days afterward that 
effectively trigger the global panic of the fall 2008. The defenders of the no-bail-out thesis 
contend that the government applied in the case of Lehman the right medicine at the right 
moment and approved its decision to deny taxpayers money to rescue the nation’s fourth-
largest investment bank. 
The present paper contributes to the debate by focusing on two main research questions 
related to the systemic nature of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. First, through the use of 
stock market data, we examine the investors’ reaction to Lehman’s failure in an attempt to 
identify an eventual contagion effect on the surviving financial institutions. Absent a rigorous 
operational definition of systemic risk, it would be presumptuous to infer from an event study 
analysis whether Lehman was indeed “systemically important.” However, a necessary 
condition for this special qualification is that the failure should have significant adverse 
knock-on effects on a large number of surviving financial institutions. Our findings indicates 
that the collateral damages associated to Lehman’s collapse were significant at least for 
several categories of firms: (i) the largest banks and financial institutions, presumably the 
most exposed to the failure of the investment bank; (ii) the financial services firms operating 
in the same product area as the failed investment bank; and (iii) firms providing mortgages, 
mortgage insurance, and other related services, i.e. operating in the most shaky sector after the 
summer 2007 and at the core of the current financial crisis. While the collateral damages were 
not generalized to all FIs, it is worth mentioning that the biggest firms, which play a crucial 
role in the financial system, were however the most affected by the Lehman crisis. Whether 
Lehman’s collapse was a “systemic event” highly depends on how one defines the boundaries 
of the “systemic risk” concept. 
Our second research question is whether the observed contagion effect affected the other 
surviving financial firms indiscriminately, that is regardless of potential differences in their 
risk profiles, financial conditions or physical exposures to Lehman. Overall, the results lend 
empirical support to the thesis that the observed contagious effects were consistent with the 
information-based contagion effect hypothesis. Otherwise stated, the contagion was firm-
specific and discriminating rather than industry-wide or undifferentiated. The most affected 
financial firms were those having common characteristics with Lehman, i.e. operating in the 
same market, subsector or product area. More importantly, the individual abnormal stock 
returns are found to be strongly correlated with financial firms’ fundamentals (risk profile, 
leverage, and profitability), suggesting that the market reaction to Lehman’s failure was 
selective and informed, rather than random and indiscriminate. 
We also detect significant abnormal jumps in the CDS spreads indicating a sudden upward 
revision in the market assessment of future default probabilities for the surviving financial 
firms, both after the Lehman failure and Ben Bernanke’s and Henry Paulson’s TARP 
speeches before the Senate Banking Committee several days later, on September 23–24, 2008. 
However, the reaction to Lehman’s failure appears of the same order of magnitude, if not 
larger, than the perceived impact of the TARP testimony. 
***** 
  
Appendix 1: A simple market-based measure of the probability of failure 
This appendix reminds the details of the basic calculations used to estimate the market-based 
measure of the probability of failure, expressed in percentage, for each FI in our sample. The 
probabilistic approach to modelling bank failures has first proposed by Blair and Heggestad 
(1978). See also Koehn and Santomero (1980) for additional insights. 
By definition, a FI failure occurs if the losses on the portfolio of assets erode its capital base: 
 
where  designates the asset earnings. Following this approach, the firm is economically 
insolvent and fails when asset earnings fall  standard deviations below  and, as a result, 
the economic capital  becomes negative. The previous equation can be restated as: 
 
Taking into account that the failure is triggered when , we can re-write the 
probability of failure in the following way: 
 
This inequality implies that the probability of failure per unit of capital is an increasing 
function of the variance of asset earnings and a decreasing function of the expected value of 
asset earnings. From an empirical point of view, the probability of failure can thus be 
estimated using stock market data as the variance of equity log-returns over the estimation 
window divided by one plus the average equity return over the same window, squared: 
 
  
References 
Acharya, V., Philippon T., Richardson M., Roubini, N., 2009. The Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009: Causes and Remedies. In: Acharya, V., Richardson, M. (Eds.), Restoring Financial 
Stability: How to Repair a Failed System. John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Adrian, T., Burke, C., McAndrews, J., 2009. The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance 15. 
Aharony, J., Swary, I., 1996. Additional evidence on the information-based contagion effects 
of bank failures. Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 57–69. 
Binder, J., 1985. Measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data. Rand Journal of 
Economics 16, 167–183. 
Blair, R., Heggestad, A., 1978. Bank portfolio regulation and the probability of bank failure: 
A note. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 10, 80–93. 
Brewer, E., Genay, H., Hunter, W., Kaufman, G., 2003. Does the Japanese stock market price 
bank-risk? Evidence from financial firm failures. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35, 
507–543. 
Brown, S., Warner, J., 1985. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 3–31. 
Cochrane, J., Zingales, L., 2009. Lehman and the financial crisis: The lesson is that 
institutions that take trading risks must be allowed to fail. Wall Street Journal, September 15. 
Cornell, B., Shapiro, A., 1986. The reaction of bank stock prices to the international debt 
crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance 10, 55–73. 
Cornett, M., Tehranian, H., 1990. An examination of the impact of the Garn-St Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 on commercial banks and savings and loan. Journal of 
Finance 45, 92–111. 
De Bandt, O., Hartmann, P., 2002. Systemic Risk: A Survey. In: Goodhart, C., Illing, G. 
(Eds.), Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort: A Reader. Oxford 
University Press. 
Fernando, C., May, A., Megginson, W., 2012. The value of investment banking relationships: 
Evidence from the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Journal of Finance 67, 235–270. 
Hull, J., Predescu, M, White, A., 2004. The relationship between Credit Default Swap 
spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 
2789–2811. 
Karafiath, I., Mynatt, R., Smith, K., 1991. The Brazilian default announcement and the 
contagion effect hypothesis. Journal of Banking and Finance 15, 699–716. 
Kaufman, G., 1994. Bank contagion: A review of the theory and evidence. Journal of 
Financial Services Research 8, 123–150. 
Kaufman, G., 2000. Banking and currency crisis and systemic risk: A taxonomy and review. 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 9, 69–131. 
Kaufman, G., Scott, K., 2003. What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators retard or 
contribute to it? The Independent Review 7, 371–391. 
Koehn, M., Santomero, A., 1980. Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk. Journal of 
Finance 35, 1235–1244 
Micu, M., Remolona, E., Wooldridge, P., 2004. The price impact of rating announcements: 
Evidence from the credit default swap market. BIS Quarterly Review, 55-65. 
Norden, L., Weber, M., 2004. Informational efficiency of Credit Default Swap and stock 
markets: The impact of credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 
2813–2843. 
O’Hara, M., Shaw, W., 1990. Deposit insurance and wealth effects: The value of being “Too 
Big To Fail.” Journal of Finance 45, 1587–1660. 
Peavy, J., Hempel, G., 1998. The Penn Square Bank failure: Effect on commercial bank 
security returns – A note. Journal of Banking and Finance 12, 141–150. 
Pop, A., Pop, D., 2009. Requiem for market discipline and the specter of TBTF in Japanese 
banking. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49, 1429–1459. 
Portes, R., 2008. The shocking errors of Iceland’s meltdown. Financial Times, October 12. 
Rogoff, K., 2008. America will need a $1,000bn bail-out. Financial Times, September 17. 
Schipper, K., Thompson, R., 1983. The impact of merger-related regulations on the 
shareholders of acquiring firms. Journal of Accounting Research 21, 184–221. 
Schwert, G., 1981. Using financial data to measure the effects of regulation. Journal of Law 
and Economics 25, 121–145. 
Taylor, J., 2009a. Defining Systemic Risk Operationally. In: Shultz, G., Scott, K., Taylor, J. 
(Eds.), Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them. Hoover Press, Stanford University. 
Taylor, J., 2009b. The financial crisis and the policy responses: An analysis of what went 
wrong. NBER Working Paper. 
Wall, L., Peterson, D., 1990. The effect of Continental Illinois’ failure on the financial 
performance of other banks. Journal of Monetary Economics 26, 77–99. 
Zellner, A., 1962. An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests 
of aggregation bias. Journal of the American Statistical Association 57, 348–368. 
Zingales, L., 2008. Causes and effects of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Hearings before 
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
  
 
Lehman
TARP
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
19
S
ep
25
S
ep
01
O
ct
07
O
ct
13
O
ct
19
O
ct
25
O
ct
31
O
ct
01
S
ep
07
S
ep
13
S
ep
Libor-OIS spread CDS 1Y Citi 
Lehman
TARP
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
01
S
ep
07
S
ep
13
S
ep
19
S
ep
25
S
ep
01
O
ct
07
O
ct
13
O
ct
19
O
ct
25
O
ct
31
O
ct
Libor-OIS spread CDS 5Y Citi
Lehman
TARP
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
01
S
ep
07
S
ep
13
S
ep
19
S
ep
25
S
ep
01
O
ct
07
O
ct
13
O
ct
19
O
ct
25
O
ct
31
O
ct
Libor-OIS spread CDS 10Y Citi






 
